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I. INTRODUCTION
HE most significant changes to established confession, search, and
seizure jurisprudence were procedural in nature this year. Texas
courts were especially concerned with proper preservation of jury
instruction error and clarified the prerequisites for obtaining such instruc-
tions. Courts continued to refine and apply well-settled substantive law.
In doing so, they typically analyzed issues under the United States Con-
stitution with an occasional nod to Texas law, especially when statutory
provisions were implicated. Generally, the courts refused to address a
state constitutional claim if the defendant did not argue that the rights
and protections under the state constitution differed from those under
the Federal Constitution.1 Although error may affect constitutional
rights, a defendant must sufficiently object when the trial judge admits
*D. Kaylyn Betts is the law clerk for Judge Michael E. Keasler.
** Michael E. Keasler is a judge on the Court of Criminal Appeals in Austin, Texas.
1. Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 96 n.59 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
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the evidence or the defendant risks forfeiting the error.2
II. CONFESSIONS
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees an
individual's privilege against self-incrimination. 3 To protect that privilege
from official coercion, courts and legislatures have developed procedural
safeguards that must be followed.4 But even when these safeguards are
not followed, any error in admitting the confession may be deemed harm-
less on appeal. 5
A. VOLUNTARINESS
"A statement of an accused may be used in evidence against him if it
appears that the same was freely and voluntarily made without compul-
sion or persuasion."'6 An accused's statement may be involuntary under:
(1) Texas's general voluntariness section in Article 38.22 of the Texas
Code of Criminal Procedure, 7 (2) Miranda v. Arizona8 as expanded in
Article 38.22, 9 or (3) the Federal Due Process Clause. 10 Article 38.22
provides greater protection to the accused than the United States Consti-
tution because Texas state law includes a broader definition of "involun-
tary" than federal law." To make a claim under the Due Process Clause
or the Miranda doctrine, a defendant must show that the confession or
waiver resulted from police overreaching. 12 In contrast, to make a claim
under Article 38.22 a defendant may show that the statement resulted
from a defendant's subjective mental state, caused by such things as hal-
lucinations, illness, or medications-independent of any police
coercion. 13
The appropriate jury instruction in a given case depends on which the-
ory of involuntariness a defendant advances.14 There are three types of
jury instructions in Texas addressing the taking of confessions: "(1) a
'general' Article 38.22, § 6 voluntariness instruction; (2) a 'general' Arti-
cle 38.22, § 7 warnings instruction (involving warnings given under § 2
and § 3); and (3) a 'specific' Article 38.23(a) exclusionary-rule instruc-
tion."'1 5 A state statutory claim of involuntariness, based on a defen-
2. Rothstein v. State, 267 S.W.3d 366, 373 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008,
pet. ref'd).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
5. E.g., Williams v. State, 257 S.W.3d 426, 436-37 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet.
ref'd).
6. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.21 (Vernon 2009).
7. Id. art. 38.22, § 6.
8. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436.
9. Art. 38.22, §§ 2-3.
10. Oursbourn v. State, 259 S.W.3d 159, 169 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
11. Id. at 173.
12. Id. at 169-70.
13. Id. at 172.
14. Id. at 169.
15. Id. at 173.
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dant's subjective mental state, warrants only a general Article 38.22
voluntariness instruction. 16 But Due Process and Miranda claims based
on police coercion may call for both general and specific voluntariness
instructions.17
Both the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals and the Fifth Circuit re-
cently clarified a trial judge's duty to instruct the jury, sua sponte, on the
voluntariness of a defendant's statement. 18 In Oursbourn, the Court of
Criminal Appeals held that a trial judge must give a general voluntariness
instruction anytime the evidence raises an issue of voluntariness. 19 But if
a defendant fails to request an appropriate instruction, any error commit-
ted by the trial judge in neglecting to include the instruction is reviewed
under Almanza's20 "egregious harm" standard. 21 In contrast, the Fifth
Circuit held that in federal prosecutions the evidence must not only raise
an issue of voluntariness, but that the issue must be clearly raised before
a trial judge has a duty to instruct the jury sua sponte.22 When the trial
judge errs in failing to give the jury an unrequested instruction, federal
courts review the error under the plain error standard. 23
B. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
Custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
of his freedom of action in any significant way."'24 Texas courts continue
to interpret the term "custodial interrogation" in Article 38.22 as consis-
tent with its meaning under federal law. 25 The Miranda doctrine and Ar-
ticle 38.22 require that law enforcement officials give a suspect certain
warnings before subjecting the suspect to custodial interrogation. 26
A person is "in custody" when a reasonable person, under the circum-
stances, would feel that "his freedom of movement was restrained to the
degree associated with a formal arrest."'27 Merely questioning a suspect
at a police station or placing handcuffs on the suspect's wrists does not
mean that the suspect is "in custody" for purposes of Miranda and Article
38.22.28 The Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Houston held that a suspect
was not in custody, despite being handcuffed and taken to a police station
16. Id. at 174.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 165; see also United States v. Guanespen-Portillo, 514 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir.
2008).
19. Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 165.
20. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
21. Oursbourn, 259 S.W.3d at 182.
22. Guanespen-Portillo, 514 F.3d at 405.
23. Id.
24. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
25. E.g., Cedillos v. State, 250 S.W.3d 145, 151 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, no pet. h.).
26. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 2(a)
(Vernon 2009).
27. Turner v. State, 252 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet.
ref'd).
28. Id. at 580; Cedillos, 250 S.W.3d at 152.
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thirty miles away, because he voluntarily left with the officers, was told
that he was being handcuffed only for their safety, and was told that he
was not under arrest. 29
To invoke Fifth Amendment protections, a suspect must unambigu-
ously assert the right to silence or counsel. 30 "Ambiguity exists when the
suspect's statement is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation
under the circumstances."'3 1 If a suspect makes an ambiguous request,
law enforcement officials may, but are not required to, clarify the sus-
pect's desire.32 Merely referring to an attorney, for example, by stating
"without a lawyer," does not require police to cease questioning the sus-
pect because the statement is ambiguous. 33 The Austin Court of Appeals
held that the defendant's seemingly clear statement that he "want[ed] to
terminate everything right now" was ambiguous after considering the cir-
cumstances, which were that just moments before making the statement
the suspect said "[y]ou guys need to talk to me, arrest me or whatever. '34
So it was reasonable for the officers to attempt to clarify whether the
suspect wanted to invoke his right to silence. 35
After asserting a Fifth Amendment right, questioning can constitution-
ally resume if the suspect reinitiates communication with the police.36 A
suspect reinitiates communication by expressing a desire to "open up a
more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investi-
gation."'37 Reinitiation does not occur when a suspect simply responds to
further police interrogation.38 The San Antonio Court of Appeals held
that a defendant reinitiated communication by saying, "So, I mean, Jay
ordered this hit. I mean, what is . . . " because the statement reflected a
desire to discuss the investigation.39
A suspect's confession resulting from custodial interrogation is not ad-
missible unless Miranda warnings were received and waived. 40 An unset-
tled issue is whether a defendant's silence, pre-arrest and pre-Miranda
warnings are admissible at trial as substantive evidence if the defendant
does not testify. Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals have decided this precise issue. 4 1 And
the federal circuits are split.42 The two Texas courts of appeals that were
29. Turner, 252 S.W.3d at 579-80.
30. Martinez v. State, 275 S.W.3d 29, 34 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, pet. disr.'d);
see also Williams v. State, 257 S.W.3d 426, 442 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet. ref'd).
31. Williams, 257 S.W.3d at 433.
32. Id. at 432-33.
33. Martinez, 275 S.W.3d at 35.
34. Williams, 257 S.W.3d at 434.
35. Id. at 433-34.
36. Martinez, 275 S.W.3d at 34.
37. Id. at 35 (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983)).
38. Pecina v. State, 268 S.W.3d 564, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
39. Martinez, 275 S.W.3d at 35-36.
40. United States v. Martinez-Larraga, 517 F.3d 258, 266 (5th Cir. 2008).
41. Hennessy v. State, 268 S.W.3d 153, 160-61 (Tex. App.-Waco 2008, pet. ref'd).
42. Id. at 161 n.1 (citing State v. Lee, 15 S.W.3d 921, 925 n.5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)).
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faced with the issue this year declined to decide it.43 The Waco Court of
Appeals disposed of its case by finding that any potential error was harm-
less.44 And, in an unpublished opinion, the Dallas Court of Appeals dis-
posed of its case by concluding that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in denying a motion for mistrial.45
C. JUVENILES
A juvenile's statement may be inadmissible under Section 51.095 of the
Texas Family Code because of noncompliance with those special require-
ments.46 A suppression order takes a different route on appeal in juve-
nile cases than it does in adult cases. Unlike adult criminal matters,
where the court of last resort is the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,47
the court of last resort for juvenile criminal matters is the Supreme Court
of Texas.48 In 2003, the Texas Legislature adopted a statute that allows
the State, for the first time, to appeal an order suppressing evidence in
the case of a violent or habitual juvenile offender if: "(A) jeopardy has
not attached in the case; (B) the prosecuting attorney certifies to the trial
court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay; and (C) the
evidence, confession, or admission is of substantial importance in the
case." 49 In In re H.V., the Supreme Court of Texas interpreted that stat-
ute for the first time.50 The court held that despite the new statute, it may
review the suppression order only if it falls within one of its other general
jurisdictional statutes.51 The court reasoned that its jurisdiction over in-
terlocutory appeals is limited to those specifically granted by statute and
the new statute does not expressly grant such jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court of Texas. 52
Many of the same requirements in Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure apply to juveniles under Section 51.095 of the Texas
Family Code. For example, the same warnings are read to both juveniles
and adults.53 Extra protection is required before questioning a juvenile
because a magistrate must read the rights and the juvenile's statement
must be signed in the presence of a magistrate outside the presence of
police and prosecutors.54 The statute does not require that a juvenile un-
derstand that it is a magistrate who is reading the warnings, as opposed to
43. Id. at 161; see also Millson v. State, No. 05-06-01378-CR, 2008 WL 82242, at * 7
(Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 9, 2008, pet. ref'd) (not designated for publication).
44. Hennessy, 268 S.W.3d at 162.
45. Millson, 2008 WL 82242, at *7.
46. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.095 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008).
47. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 5(a).
48. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(a) (Vernon 2001).
49. § 56.03(b)(5) (Vernon Supp. 2008); see also In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 322 (Tex.
2008).
50. In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d at 320.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 321-22.
53. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 38.22(b) (Vernon 2001); see also TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 51.095(a)(1) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2009).
54. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.095(a)(1)(A)(B)(i).
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a police officer or anyone else; it only requires that the person reading
the warnings is a magistrate. 55 A juvenile must knowingly, intelligently,
and voluntarily waive the rights before a confession is admissible,56 but
there is no requirement that each right be waived individually. 57
A child's age is relevant to voluntariness,58 custody,59 and waiver. 60
But it is unclear if age is relevant to whether juveniles have invoked their
rights.61 The Supreme Court of Texas did not decide this question in In re
H. V. because it held that under either standard, a child's statement that
he "wanted his mother to ask for an attorney" unambiguously invoked
the right to counsel. 62
D. SixTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches when "adversary judi-
cial criminal proceedings" begin. 63 Adversary judicial proceedings begin
when a defendant makes an "initial appearance before a judicial officer,
where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is subject to restric-
tion. ' 64 The Supreme Court of the United States recently applied this
constitutional requirement specifically to Texas procedural law by hold-
ing that an Article 15.17 hearing marks the beginning of adversary judi-
cial proceedings and, therefore, the protections of the Sixth
Amendment. 65 This is so even if no prosecutor is aware of or involved in
the hearing. 66 Article 15.17 requires that an arrestee be brought before a
neutral and detached magistrate without unnecessary delay, but no later
than forty-eight hours after being arrested.67 At the hearing, the magis-
trate must inform the arrestee of the accusations, give statutory warnings,
set bail, and appoint counsel if the magistrate is so authorized.68 A sus-
pect's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches at this time because
"the State's relationship with the defendant has become solidly
adversarial. '69
55. In re J.L., No. 10-06-00246-CV, 2007 WL 3298920, at *3 (Tex. App.-Waco Nov. 7,
2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
56. § 51.095(a)(1)(C).
57. In re J.L., 2007 WL 3298920, at *5.
58. Id. at *2.
59. In re J.A.B., 281 S.W.3d 62, 59-66 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.).
60. In re H.V., 252 S.W.3d 319, 326 (Tex. 2008) (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707,
725 (1979)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 326-27.
63. Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 128 S. Ct. 2578, 2583 (2008) (quoting United States
v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984)).
64. Id. at 2592.
65. Id. at 2583-84.
66. Id. at 2588.
67. TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 15.17(a) (Vernon 2009).
68. Id.
69. Rothgery, 128 S. Ct. at 2586.
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Ill. SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. 70 During
this Survey period, courts continued to balance an individual's privacy
interests against the government's law enforcement interests when ana-
lyzing search and seizure issues. 71
A. DEFINITIONS
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution prohibit "unreasonable
searches and seizures."' 72 To invoke the protections of these provisions,
an individual must make a threshold showing that the government con-
ducted a search or seizure within the constitutional definition.73 An in-
trusion rises to the level of a search or seizure only if an individual has a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the place invaded.74
More than ten years ago, in State v. Hardy,75 the Texas Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals held that a patient does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the results of a blood-alcohol test taken by hospital personnel
for medical purposes after a traffic accident. 76 So, the defendant's Fourth
Amendment rights were not violated when the State later obtained the
records through a grand jury subpoena. 77 Five years later, Congress en-
acted the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),
which limits a healthcare provider's ability to disclose a patient's medical
records to others.78 Three Texas Courts of Appeal recently rejected the
argument that HIPAA preempted the holding in Hardy by recognizing a
reasonable privacy interest in medical records. 79 The Austin Court of
Appeals concluded that the narrow holding in Hardy did not conflict with
HIPAA because the court in Hardy addressed only the narrow issue of
whether an individual had a reasonable expectation of privacy in
blood-alcohol test results-not whether an individual had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in medical records generally.80 Additionally,
HIPAA does not conflict with Hardy because HIPAA allows healthcare
providers to disclose medical records when the grand jury issues a
70. Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 97 n.68 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434
U.S. 106, 108-09 (1977)).
71. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1604 (2008); see also Herring v. United
States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009).
72. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9.
73. See Kirsch v. State, 276 S.W.3d 579, 587-89 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008,
no pet. h.).
74. Davidson v. State, 249 S.W.3d 709, 725 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet. ref'd).
75. 963 S.W.2d 516, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
76. See Kennemur v. State, 280 S.W.3d 305, 311-12 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet.
ref'd).
77. Hardy, 963 S.W.2d at 527.
78. Kirsch, 276 S.W.3d at 586.
79. Id. at *7; Kennemur, 280 S.W.3d at 312; Murray v. State, 245 S.W.3d 37, 41-42 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2007, pet. ref'd).




B. WARRANTLESS ARRESTS, STOPS, OR INQUIRIES
It is well established that there are three types of interactions between
citizens and law enforcement officials: (1) encounters, (2) investigative
detentions, and (3) arrests. It is only the two latter categories that invoke
constitutional scrutiny. 82
1. Encounters
A consensual encounter does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. 83
A police officer may approach citizens on the street, in their car, at their
home door, or even at their motel door without having any level of suspi-
cion. 84 An encounter with police may be inconvenient or embarrassing,
but the interaction does not become an investigative detention unless
"the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person
that the person was not free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter. '85
Courts apply a totality of the circumstances approach, where no single
factor is dispositive, in deciding where to draw the line between an en-
counter and a detention.86 In Garcia-Cantu, the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals considered the following factors relevant:
" The officer's use of language, tone of voice, and demeanor; 87
" The location and time of day;88
" The officer's use of a spotlight, flashlight, and emergency lights;89
" The patrol car's position and whether it blocked the citizen's exit;90
and
" The citizen's subjective feelings.91
After considering these factors, the court held that a reasonable person
would not have "felt free to leave or terminate [the] encounter. '92
2. Detentions
Unlike a consensual encounter, which does not require the police to
have any suspicion, an officer must have a reasonable and articulable sus-
picion that a person is involved in criminal activity to justify a deten-
81. Id.
82. See State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 243; Bouyer v. State, 264 S.W.3d 265, 270 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, no
pet. h.) (mem. op.).
85. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d at 242-43 (citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439
(1991)).
86. See id.
87. Id. at 244-45, 248.
88. Id. at 244-45.
89. Id. at 245, 247-49.
90. Id. at 246, 249.
91. Id. at 249.
92. Id.
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tion.93 Although the State does not have to prove that a defendant
actually violated the law, 9 4 the suspicion must be related to a violation of
the law.95 An officer's reasonable belief that a defendant is violating the
law cannot be based on the officer's misunderstanding that a certain ac-
tivity is against the law.96 For example, an officer's mistaken belief that
crossing a lane line was a violation of the traffic code did not justify stop-
ping the driver when the law prohibits only crossings that are danger-
ous. 97 Additionally, an officer's suspicion must point to a particular
person; the time of day and level of criminal activity in an area alone is
not specific enough to establish reasonable suspicion that a certain indi-
vidual is engaging in or about to engage in criminal activity. 98
A frequently litigated issue is whether an informant's tip in a given case
creates reasonable suspicion. A completely anonymous tip, on its own, is
not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion; it must be corroborated. 99
On the other hand, a tip personally given to an officer by a witness who
has no other involvement in the crime establishes reasonable suspicion
without corroboration. 100 In between these two scenarios, the Fifth Cir-
cuit noted that the reliability of an otherwise anonymous tip increases if
the police can trace the phone number to the informant because the in-
formant is then exposed to liability for false complaints.10' The court re-
jected the defendant's argument that the reliability of a tip does not
increase unless the informant is aware that the call can be traced. 0 2 The
court reasoned that regardless of whether the government proved that
the informant actually knew his call could be traced, caller identification
is so widespread that the informant must have known that he could be
subject to liability for giving false information.103 The Fort Worth Court
of Appeals, however, found that the reliability of a tip did not increase
when police may have learned only the name of the person registered to
the phone number-not the name of the actual informant. 1°4 If the in-
formant voluntarily gives his name and describes himself and the suspect,
then the tip may also be reliable even if the informant does not meet with
police face-to-face.10 5
A detention justified at its inception may become invalid if its scope is
93. Id. at 238.
94. Hicks v. State, 255 S.W.3d 351, 354 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, no pet. h.).
95. State v. Griffey, 241 S.W.3d 700, 705 n.4 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. ref'd).
96. Fowler v. State, 266 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. dism'd).
97. Id. at 503-04.
98. Hudson v. State, 247 S.W.3d 780, 786-87 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, no pet. h.).
99. Swaffar v. State, 258 S.W.3d 254, 259-60 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2008, pet. ref'd).
100. Griffey, 241 S.W.3d at 704-05; e.g. Martinez v. State, 261 S.W.3d 773, 776 (Tex.
App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd).
101. United States v. Casper, 536 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2008).
102. Id. at 415 n.5.
103. Id.
104. Swaffar, 258 S.W.3d at 259-60.
105. United States v. Vickers, 540 F.3d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 2008).
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unreasonable. 10 6 The duration of a stop may make the detention unrea-
sonable.10 7 There are no rigid time limitations, and the reasonableness of
the duration depends on whether the officers were diligently pursuing
their suspicions. 10 8 The Texarkana Court of Appeals followed the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals's lead when holding that a traffic stop that
lasted twenty minutes while officers waited for a drug dog to arrive was
reasonable because the officers did not delay in attempting to secure a
dog. 109 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that, while detaining a
driver for twenty-seven minutes "approach[ed] the edge of reasonable-
ness," it was nevertheless reasonable.110 In that case, the delay was
caused by waiting for a more experienced officer, who could perform the
investigation faster, to arrive. 1 During the wait, the officer at the scene
called the more experienced officer four times to see when she would
arrive.1 12
3. Arrests
Unlike a detention, which requires only reasonable suspicion, under
Texas statutory law, a warrantless arrest requires both probable cause and
the application of a statutory exception to the warrant requirement. 11 3
One of the exceptions allows an officer to arrest an individual for an of-
fense that was committed in the officer's presence.1 14 The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals held that a trial judge's implicit findings that the defen-
dant committed the offense of driving while intoxicated in the officer's
presence was supported by the record.1 15 The case has a complicated
procedural history, including a trip back to the Beaumont Court of Ap-
peals because that court initially erred in assuming that a videotape sup-
ported the trial judge's findings when the tape was not included in the
appellate record.1 6 The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the court of
appeals a second time because the court erred in requiring direct evi-
dence of the defendant's performance on the field sobriety test.117 The
court stated that a trial judge, just "like any [other] factfinder, [could]
make reasonable inferences from the evidence.' ' 1 8
Officers outside their jurisdiction may arrest an individual without a
warrant only if the individual commits a felony or breach of the peace in
106. United States v. Escareno Sanchez, 507 F.3d 877, 881 (5th Cir. 2007), vacated, 128
S. Ct. 2428 (2008); United States v. Estrada, 459 F.3d 627, 631 (5th Cir. 2006).
107. Love v. State, 252 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2008, pet. ref'd).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 688; see also Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 517 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)
(finding a twenty-five minute wait for a drug dog appropriate).
110. Belcher v. State, 244 S.W.3d 531, 541-42 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2007, no pet.).
111. Id. at 541.
112. Id.
113. See CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 14.01-.04 (Vernon 2005 & Supp. 2008).
114. Art. 14.01(b).
115. Amador v. State, 275 S.W.3d 872, 879-80 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
116. See Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 668-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
117. Amador, 275 S.W.3d at 879-80.
118. Id. at 878-79.
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the officer's presence.11 9 The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that an
officer who was outside of his jurisdiction could arrest a driver for driving
while intoxicated even though the officer witnessed only a minor traffic
violation because the officer's observations corroborated an informant's
tip that the driver was driving recklessly and was possibly intoxicated.1 20
Under federal law, a warrantless arrest for a crime committed in an
officer's presence is justified by probable cause alone. 12 1 In Virginia v.
Moore, the Supreme Court of the United States considered whether the
police officers' warrantless arrest, based on probable cause but prohibited
by Virginia state law, violated the Fourth Amendment.1 2 2 Two police of-
ficers arrested Moore for driving with a suspended license, which was not
an arrestable offense under Virginia law on the facts of this case.123
Moore moved to suppress cocaine found during a search incident to ar-
rest under the Fourth Amendment. 124 The Supreme Court of Virginia
held that Moore's federal constitutional rights were violated because
state law allowed the officers to issue only a citation and there is no ex-
ception to the warrant requirement for a search incident to a citation.125
While the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that states are
free to offer their citizens more protection under state law, it held that
the Fourth Amendment requires only probable cause to arrest an individ-
ual when an officer observes a crime; a state law prohibiting the arrest
has no effect. 12 6 To hold otherwise, the Court said, would cause federal
constitutional rights to vary from state to state and destroy a bright-line
standard. 127
C. WARRANTLESS SEARCHES
As a general rule, law enforcement officials must obtain a warrant
before conducting a search. 128 But courts have "carved out numerous
exceptions to the warrant requirement. 1 29 Some of the exceptions dis-
cussed by the courts lately-such as search incident to a lawful arrest,
emergency doctrine, and inventory searches-are well established.
Others, such as a search pursuant to the DNA statute, are newly created.
The search incident to a lawful arrest exception allows police to search
an arrestee and the area "within his immediate control" without a
warrant. 1
30
The Fifth Circuit undertook another case this year in which an officer
119. Art. 14.03(d).
120. Martinez v. State, 261 S.W.3d 773, 777-78 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, pet. ref'd).
121. See Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1604 (2008).
122. Id. at 1601.
123. Id. at 1601-02.
124. Id. at 1602.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1607-08.
127. Id. at 1607.
128. Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 97 n.68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
129. Id.
130. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
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searched a driver's cell phone after an arrest.13' The court rejected the
government's argument that the search was incident to arrest because the
officers did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant. 132 It also
rejected the argument that the officers did not need probable cause be-
cause searching a cell phone is equivalent to a license check and the de-
fendant consented to the search.' 33 The court found that it was not
objectively reasonable to understand the defendant's consent to search of
the car to extend to the cell phone because it was placed on the roof of
the vehicle immediately after the stop. 1 34 Additionally, the search was
not equivalent to running a license check because, unlike a driver's li-
cense, a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information
contained in a cell phone.135
Another exception frequently discussed during this Survey period was
the emergency doctrine. Under this doctrine, police officers may conduct
a warrantless search "if they are acting on a reasonable belief that doing
so is immediately necessary 'to protect or preserve life or avoid serious
injury.'"136 In deciding whether an officer's belief is objectively reasona-
ble, courts consider the facts and circumstances that the officer knew at
the time of the search. 137 An officer's training and experience in similar
situations may be considered when assessing whether the officer's infer-
ences are objectively reasonable.' 38
In Pitonyak v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals extended the emer-
gency doctrine to justify an entry by a private citizen. 139 The court held
that the victim's stepfather lawfully entered the defendant's apartment
under the emergency doctrine after no one responded to repeated knocks
on the door.140 The victim had been missing for two days, she was last
seen with the defendant, her car was parked outside the apartment, and
the defendant lied about the last time that he saw the victim.' 41 The
court held that all of these facts would lead a reasonable officer to believe
that the victim was seriously injured or threatened inside the
apartment. 142
Both the Fifth Circuit and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals consid-
ered whether it was reasonable for officers to enter a residence when the
131. United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 571 (5th Cir. 2008).
132. Id. at 568.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 576.
135. Id. at 577.
136. Shepherd v. State, 273 S.W.3d 681, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (quoting Mincey v.




139. 253 S.W.3d 834, 850 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet. ref'd) (citing Miles v. State, 241
S.W.3d 28, 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)).
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occupants failed to answer the door. 143 In Shepherd, the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals held that it was reasonable for the officers to believe that
entering the house was necessary to protect or preserve life.144 In that
case, the defendant's neighbors called 911 to report that the defendant's
front door was open even though it was routinely closed. 145 When the
police came to the defendant's house and called for him, no one re-
sponded.' 46 Based on their experience in similar situations, the officers
were concerned that a burglary had taken place and that the homeowners
were hurt inside.' 47
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit held that border patrol agents did not have
a reasonable belief that suspected aliens were in need of assistance simply
because they failed to answer the door. 148 Unlike in Shepherd, where the
officers believed a victim of a recent burglary was inside, 149 the agents in
Troop believed that the suspected aliens were fatigued after a long jour-
ney. 150 The signs of physical distress did not rise to the level required for
immediate entry.151 Although citing the Supreme Court of the United
States's case from 2006 that held that "an officer's subjective motivation
is irrelevant," the court still found it noteworthy that none of the agents
believed the occupants needed assistance until after the entry.152 And
without any objective evidence of medical distress beyond mere fatigue,
the occupants' failure to answer the door was not enough for the agents
to enter constitutionally without a warrant. 153
An inventory search is another exception to the warrant requirement.
An inventory search is proper if (1) an inventory policy exists and (2) the
police followed the policy. 154 Although some federal circuit court cases
have reached the opposite conclusion, 155 the Eastland Court of Appeals
distinguished those cases and held that the inventory search exception
does not apply when an officer neglects to follow the procedure of filling
out a written inventory list.156
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized a new exception to
the warrant requirement this year. The federal government and all states
have statutes requiring that DNA be collected from individuals convicted
143. Shepherd, 273 S.W.3d at 682-83; see also United States v. Troop, 514 F.3d 405, 409
(5th Cir. 2008).
144. Shepherd, 273 S.W.3d at 684-85.
145. Id. at 682-83.
146. Id. at 683.
147. Id. at 682-83.
148. Troop, 514 F.3d at 411.
149. Shepherd, 273 S.W.3d at 683-84.
150. Troop, 514 F.3d at 410.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 411 (citing Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006)).
153. Id. at 410.
154. State v. Stauder, 264 S.W.3d 360, 364 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2008, pet. ref'd) (citing
Moberg v. State, 810 S.W.2d 190, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)).
155. Id. at 363 (citing United States v. Loaiza-Martin, 832 F.2d 867 (5th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Mayfield, 161 F.3d 1143 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. Trullo, 790 F.2d
205 (1st Cir. 1986)).
156. Id. at 364.
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of certain felonies and then stored in a databank to assist law enforce-
ment in solving mainly sex-related crimes.' 57 While the Supreme Court
of the United States has not addressed the constitutionality of such stat-
utes, most courts have upheld searches pursuant to them under either the
"special needs" test or the "totality-of-the-circumstances" test.158 Follow-
ing the latter rationale, the Court of Criminal Appeals held that a war-
rantless search of a prisoner for blood taken pursuant to Texas's
mandatory DNA statute was reasonable. 159
D. WARRANT SEARCHES & SEIZURES
Before a magistrate may issue a search warrant, a police officer must
first present a sworn affidavit setting forth sufficient facts to establish
probable cause. 160 In special cases, additional requirements must also be
met.161 Unlike warrants for persons, contraband, fruits, or instrumentali-
ties-which may be issued by any magistrate-warrants for mere evi-
dence that a crime has been committed may be issued only by "a judge of
a municipal court of record or county court who is an attorney licensed by
the State of Texas, statutory county court, district court, the Court of
Criminal Appeals, or the [Texas] Supreme Court. 1 62 But an exception
to that rule allows any magistrate to issue a mere evidence warrant when
"the only judges serving the county who are licensed attorneys are two or
more district judges each of whose district includes more than one
county."
163
In Muniz v. State, the First Court of Appeals in Houston interpreted
this exception. 164 The court rejected the plain meaning of the statute be-
cause it would lead to the absurd result that any magistrate in Colorado
County could not issue mere evidence warrants because the county has
two nondistrict court judges who are licensed attorneys, even though
those judges are otherwise prohibited from issuing mere evidence war-
rants.165 So the court read the exception to mean that any magistrate can
issue mere evidence warrants when the "only judges serving a county who
are licensed attorneys and who are authorized to issue article 18.02(10)
search warrants are district judges serving more than one county. '166
Once a warrant of any kind has been issued, it "must be executed
within three days from the time of its issuance. ' 167 A warrant that is
executed after this time is stale, and any search or seizure pursuant to the
157. See Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 97 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
158. See id. at 97-98.
159. Id. at 98-99.
160. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(b) (Vernon Supp. 2007).
161. E.g., art. 18.01(c).
162. Id.
163. Id. art. 18.01(i).
164. 264 S.W.3d 392, 396-98 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
165. Id. at 397.
166. Id. at 398.
167. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 18.06(a) (Vernon 2005).
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warrant is invalid absent an exception to the warrant requirement.168 The
time between when a warrant is issued and when it becomes stale is
"three whole days, exclusive of the day of its issuance and of the day of its
execution. 1 69 The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected the State's inter-
pretation of "days" to mean a twenty-four hour period, which would
make a warrant valid for 120 hours after it was issued.1 70 Rather, the
court held that a warrant is stale if the State does not execute it before
midnight on the fourth day after it was issued. 171 Within this timeframe,
the police may execute the warrant at any time.1 72 So it is within a police
officer's discretion to decide who will be present when a warrant is exe-
cuted by delaying or expediting a search when certain individuals are at
the location.173
A properly issued warrant that is executed within the required
timeframe may still be invalid if the State exceeds the scope of the war-
rant. A search of an automobile found at the premises to be searched is
generally within the scope of a warrant authorizing a search of only the
premises.174 But it is better practice to include a description of the vehi-
cle in the warrant whenever feasible.1 75 In Hedspeth, the Austin Court of
Appeals held that the police did not exceed the scope of a warrant by
searching a car in a motel parking lot because information in the affidavit
reduced the possibility that the wrong vehicle would be searched. 176
E. EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The exclusionary rule requires trial judges to suppress improperly ob-
tained evidence under certain circumstances. 177 The purpose of the rule
is to deter police misconduct. 178 So, under the good-faith exception, the
exclusionary rule does not apply when police act in "objectively reasona-
ble reliance" on an invalid warrant, unconstitutional statute, or mistaken
information in a court database caused by judicial error.1 79
The Supreme Court of the United States narrowed the scope of the
exclusionary rule by holding that the rule is not triggered by negligent
police error.1 80 In Herring, a sheriff's deputy arrested Herring for a war-
rant that computer records showed as current but had been unknowingly
recalled. 181 The Supreme Court held that evidence obtained incident to
168. State v. Rico, 241 S.W.3d 648, 649 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2008, no pet. h.).
169. Art. 18.07.
170. Rico, 241 S.W.3d at 649.
171. Id. at 650.
172. Allen v. State, 249 S.W.3d 680, 697 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, no pet. h.).
173. Id.
174. Hedspeth v. State, 249 S.W.3d 732, 738 (Tex. App.-Austin 2008, pet. ref'd).
175. Id. at 740 n.3.
176. Id. at 740.
177. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914); CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
38.23(a) (Vernon 2005).
178. Herring v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 695, 701 (2009).
179. Id. at 703.
180. Id. at 704.
181. Id. at 698.
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the arrest was not subject to exclusion because the deputy relied on the
computer records in good-faith and, although law enforcement was re-
sponsible for the error, it was the result of mere negligence. 182 The Su-
preme Court rejected a rigid application of the exclusionary rule, and
instead balanced the deterrent effect on police misconduct against the
social costs of letting a guilty defendant go free.183 In the balance, the
deterrent effect did not outweigh the social costs because "the error was
the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest."'1 84 To trig-
ger the exclusionary rule, police misconduct must be sufficiently deliber-
ate, reckless, or systemically negligent that suppressing the evidence will
deter future conduct. 185
Under the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, evidence obtained indi-
rectly from police misconduct is also suppressed under the exclusionary
rule. 18 6 But evidence that would not have been discovered "but for" the
misconduct is not automatically excluded.1 87 Once the evidence becomes
so attenuated from the misconduct that it is brought about by "means
sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint," it is no
longer subject to the exclusionary rule. 188 The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals recently held that evidence of a criminal offense committed after
an illegal entry should not have been suppressed. 189 In Iduarte, an officer
testified that the defendant pointed a gun at him after the officer fol-
lowed the defendant into his apartment.' 90 The Court reasoned that,
even assuming the officer's entry into the apartment was unlawful, the
federal exclusionary rule and article 38.23 did not apply because evidence
of the crime did not exist before the entry, and thus was not "causally
connected" to any constitutional violation.191
In Texas, a defendant has two options to challenge the jury's ability to
consider evidence obtained during an allegedly illegal search or
seizure. 192 A defendant can first challenge the admissibility of the evi-
dence by either filing a pretrial motion to suppress or objecting when the
evidence is offered at trial.1 93 If unsuccessful, a defendant can challenge
the jury's ability to consider the evidence by requesting an instruction to
disregard the evidence if the jury finds that it was illegally obtained.1 94
Texas's exclusionary rule, set out in article 38.23, states in part:
182. Id. at 700.
183. Id. at 704.
184. Id. at 698.
185. Id. at 702.
186. State v. Iduarte, 268 S.W.3d 544, 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963)).
187. Id.
188. Id. (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488).
189. Id. at 551.
190. Id. at 548.
191. Id. at 551.
192. Holmes v. State, 248 S.W.3d 194, 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 199-200.
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(a) No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation
of any provisions of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or
of the Constitution or laws of the United States of America, shall be
admitted in evidence against the accused on the trial of any criminal
case.
In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the
jury shall be instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt,
that the evidence was obtained in violation of the provisions of this
Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disregard any such evi-
dence so obtained.1 95
Therefore, evidence may be suppressed if the trial judge finds that it was
obtained in violation of the law, or the jury can be instructed to disregard
the evidence if it finds a violation.
A defendant is entitled to a jury instruction as a matter of statutory
right if: (1) the evidence raises a contested issue of material fact that a
constitutional violation has occurred and (2) the trial court has admitted
the evidence. 196 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals issued two opin-
ions that give further guidance on these prerequisites.' 97
Addressing the first prerequisite, the court clarified what type of evi-
dence is sufficient to raise a disputed issue of material fact.198 Breaking
the requirement down, a defendant must show evidence that (1) raises an
issue of fact, (2) is affirmatively contested, and (3) is material to whether
the conduct was lawful. 199 The court held that the defendant was not
entitled to an instruction because the evidence failed to meet all three
requirements. 200 The instruction the defendant requested was "wholly in-
correct" because it asked the jury to decide a question of law-not
fact.201
Addressing the second prerequisite, the court held that objecting to the
admissibility of evidence is not required before obtaining a jury instruc-
tion.202 Clarifying its own precedent and settling a dispute among the
courts of appeals, the court held that a defendant is entitled to a jury
instruction after making a request, despite stating "no objection" or fail-
ing to object when the State offers the contested evidence at trial.203 The
court explained that it does not make sense to require a defendant to
invalidly object to the admissibility of evidence simply to preserve the
right to request a jury instruction later.204 The admissibility of evidence
195. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.23(a) (Vernon 2005).
196. Holmes, 248 S.W.3d at 199 (quoting Pierce v. State, 32 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2000)).
197. Id. at 199-202; see also Madden v. State, 242 S.W.3d 504, 509-511 (Tex. Crim. App.
2007).
198. Madden, 242 S.W.3d at 509-10.
199. Id. at 510.
200. Id. at 518.
201. Id. at 510.
202. Holmes, 248 S.W.3d at 202.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 200.
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and the jury's consideration of evidence are two separate issues.205 The
defendant must raise a contested issue of fact concerning the legality of
the search or seizure to be entitled to a jury instruction.20 6 But when the
State offers the evidence at trial, the facts are typically not yet in dispute
because the defense has not presented its case-in-chief. 20 7 At that time,
the defendant may well have "no objection" to the admissibility of the
evidence, but that does not mean that the defendant waives the right to
raise a disputed issue of fact later and request a jury instruction. 20 8
The court's opinion did not disturb its holding in other cases that failing
to object or expressly waiving an objection does forfeit the right to com-
plain on appeal that the evidence was inadmissible.20 9 But at least two
courts of appeal have found that a defendant preserved the right to com-
plain that a trial judge erroneously admitted evidence even after declar-
ing they had "no objection" when the evidence was offered.210 In both
cases, the trial judge expressly treated any error as preserved despite trial
counsel's apparent waiver. 211 For example, one trial judge held a sup-
pression hearing after defense counsel said he had "no objection" to the
evidence offered by the State.212 Another trial judge told defense coun-
sel that the judge considered the issue preserved for appeal. 213
IV. CONCLUSION
A survey of confession, search, and seizure cases over the past year
reveals that Texas state and federal courts have clarified some procedural
requirements. Generally, however, the courts continued to apply well-
established precedent.
205. Id. at 202.
206. Id. at 199.
207. Id. at 200.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 196.
210. Bouyer v. State, 264 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2008, no pet.)
(mem. op.); Shedden v. State, 268 S.W.3d 717, 730 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2008, no
pet.).
211. Bouyer, 264 S.W.3d at 268-69; Shedden, 268 S.W.3d at 730.
212. Bouyer, 264 S.W.3d at 268-69.
213. Shedden, 268 S.W.3d at 730.
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